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Abstract
We augment standard models of cultural transmission with an explicit account of
social learning, grounded in the information transmission literature. Youngsters observe
the behavioral trait of a role model and form beliefs about the desirability of that trait.
Adults have better information about each trait and have a paternalistic attitude toward
their children. This makes them reluctant to adopt myopic behavior to avoid setting a
negative example to their children. This signaling distortion increases in the influence
parents have over their offspring. We extend the model to allow parental influence to
depend on the population frequency of each trait and show that cultural complementarity
does not imply convergence to a homogeneous population. We find empirical support for
a positive relationship between parental influence and propensity to exert self-restraint
by looking at alcohol and tobacco consumption.
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1 Introduction
The cultural transmission literature has roots in the pioneering work of socio-biologists such
as Cavalli Sforza and Feldmann (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985). Starting from Bisin
and Verdier (1998, 2001a), a literature on this topic has also recently emerged in economics
(see Bisin and Verdier, 2011, for a survey of contributions). These works have augmented the
early socio-biology models with key elements of economic theory like strategic behavior and
optimization, thus firmly setting cultural transmission within the boundaries of standard
economics. The core features of most existing models, however, are still to a large extent
borrowed from models of genetic transmission. Cultural transmission is seen as a sort of
“black box”. Young individuals typically acquire their cultural traits from role models (who
may be their parent or another adult), but the way in which this socialization process works is
not explicitly spelled out. We argue that this is unnecessary. Economists have long worked
with models of information transmission and (Bayesian) social learning that have proved
useful in understanding important socio-cultural phenomena (see e.g. Banerjee, 1992, and
Bikchandani et al., 1992).
The idea that social learning may matter for cultural transmission is of course not new
(see e.g. Bandura and Walters, 1963). Many existing models of cultural transmission ac-
knowledge the importance of social learning and often justify their assumptions by invoking
it.1 However, there is almost an implicit belief that augmenting existing models with a
worked-out account of social learning would add little, if anything at all. This implicit
understanding has not been properly scrutinized, though.
This paper aims at filling this gap. We build a simple model, where agents are hetero-
geneous in their tastes and can adopt one of two alternative behavioral traits (e.g. self-
gratification or abstinence). In our model, there is thus a conceptual distinction between
tastes (that agents take as given) and behavioral traits (that agents can intentionally adopt).
We then use this setup to pit the predictions of standard mechanisms of cultural transmis-
sion against those of a more sophisticated mechanism which also includes social learning. In
1For instance, Bisin and Topa (2010) mention indirect socialization, whereby “...children ... imitate or learn
from their parents’ or siblings’ behavior”, as an important aspect of socialization. Moreover, social learning
is, together with genetic inheritance, one of the pillars of the dual inheritance theory (see Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman, 1981, Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
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standard models, the process of cultural transmission takes the form of children passively
inheriting their preferences from a role model of the older generation. The social learning
model augments this mechanism by allowing also for information transmission: Children
observe the behavior of their role model and update their beliefs about the desirability of
the observed behavioral trait.
We find that explicitly accounting for the role of social learning generates novel effects.
The key observation is that the adults’ behavior conveys information to children, thus gen-
erating an information externality. Moreover, informed parents are aware that their own
behavior sets relevant “examples” to their children, and may thus modify it strategically.
This feature is absent from standard models, since the children’s behavior is usually entirely
determined by their inherited preference trait.
In principle, information transmission need not by itself affect outcomes. However, it
becomes relevant when parents have a paternalistic attitude towards their offspring, so that
their objectives are imperfectly aligned with those of their children. In this case, information
transmission leaves a signature in the form of a “signaling distortion” in parental behavior.
To see how this works, consider for instance a parent concerned that her child may take up
smoking. Acknowledging that this may be setting a “bad example” to the child (e.g., by
suggesting that smoking is not harmful, or that it is the socially acceptable thing to do),
she may refrain from smoking herself. What’s more, her incentive to quit smoking will be
larger the larger her influence (in the sense described above) over the child. Hence, the social
learning model predicts a positive relationship between parental influence and the parents’
propensity to exert self-restraint. We argue that this “disciplining effect” can be used to
empirically validate the role of information transmission in socialization.2
Recent experimental and field evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that parents do
modify their behavior when observed by their children. In a coin-toss experiment, Houser
2In standard models, the cultural transmission mechanism exclusively works at a deeper level, in the
domain of preferences. As a result, there is no incentive to distort one’s behavior in order to strategically
manipulate information transmission. Of course, one could always postulate that children’s preferences are
shaped by the behavior of their role models (as opposed to their preferences), thus replicating the main feature
of the social learning model. However, we argue that such a theory would be more parsimoniously captured
by a model of social learning where agents behave as if they were strategically sending (and receiving)
information about the actual consequences of a particular behavior.
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et al. (2016) find that parents are more reluctant to cheat when their child is in the room.
Similarly, Ben-Ner et al. (2015) report that parents increase their contributions in the
dictator game when these will be shown to their children.
In a dynamic extension, we also look at the implications of the discipling effect for the
long run distribution of traits in the population. In their seminal contribution, Bisin and
Verdier (2001a) analyze the forces that may generate the persistence of the high degree of
cultural heterogeneity observed in modern societies. They identify cultural substitutability as
a key factor.3 Under cultural substitutability, as a cultural trait becomes rarer, the influence
of parents displaying the rare trait must increase relative to that of parents displaying the
alternative trait. We show that social learning generates richer dynamics and that some
form of heterogeneity may persist even in the presence of cultural complementarity. The
intuition is as follows. Suppose that, as a behavioral trait involving abstinence spreads
among the population, the influence of adults displaying the alternative trait (e.g. smoking)
is reduced ; i.e. smoking adults become relatively less likely to transmit their trait to the next
generation. This type of cultural complementarity might for instance arise if the signals sent
by parents become less salient when they do not conform to prevailing behavior in society.
Under standard cultural evolution, if the initial share of adults choosing abstinence is large
enough, abstinence would then spread all the way and the alternative trait would vanish in
the long run. With social learning, in contrast, the behavioral trait adopted by parents is
endogenous with respect to parental influence. As the influence of parental smoking fades,
adults who like smoking become less concerned about the example set to their children.
Some of those who would choose abstinence for signaling reasons may thus conclude that it
is safe to switch to smoking. This effect clearly works as a counterweight to the spread of
abstinence, thus allowing for the persistence of some degree of heterogeneity.
A secondary benefit of explicitly distinguishing between intrinsic tastes and behavioral
traits is that the model is sufficiently rich to also accommodate the social rewards from
conforming to the behavior of peers or to the norms of society at large.4 We thus study
3See also Panebianco and Verdier (2015) for how cultural substitutability preserves heterogeneity even
when the transmission network is biased toward a specific trait.
4The role of conformity is also acknowledged by socio-biologists, who typically allow cultural transmission
to have a conformist bias See also Sae´z-Mart´ı (2011) and Sae´z-Mart´ı and Zenou (2012). Bernheim (1994)
provides an alternative way to model pressure to conform.
4
how the desire to conform interacts with parents’ signaling distortion to shape observed
behavior and culture. For instance, a childless individual may refrain from smoking not
in order to set an example to his (non-existing) child, but because his acquaintances, who
may have children, are non smokers. In practice, most people form their habits in part by
interacting with others. Working, eating, drinking, smoking, religious rituals are partly social
activities. From an empirical viewpoint, this complicates the task of detecting the effect of
social learning by using differences in parental influence across individuals, who may in fact
share the same norms of behavior. Whether individual parental influence is a good predictor
of adults’ propensity to adopt a particular habit or the desire to conform tends to prevail is
essentially an empirical question.
In Section 6 we provide some evidence for the key empirical implications of model. We
use data collected as part of the Iowa Youth and Families Project. These data cover 451
households and include a parental influence index based on the reported influence that both
fathers and mothers believe they have on their children. This information makes the data
uniquely suited to assess the relationship between parental influence and parents’ propensity
for self-restraint. We compare smoking and drinking habits across parents with low and high
perceived influence, controlling for a number of parent, child and household characteristics.
We find strong evidence that high influence fathers refrain more from smoking than low
influence ones. The results for drinking are more noisy but go in the same direction. Inter-
estingly, while both high influence mothers and high influence fathers tend to drink less than
their low influence counterparts, the results are statistically significant only for mothers. To
better account for heterogeneity across households, we also use propensity score matching
to estimate the effect of parental influence by matching households that are homogeneous
in terms of observable characteristics. Relative to the results obtained with OLS, we find
significant differences in smoking and drinking behavior both for fathers and mothers in
the direction predicted by the theory. Finally, we check the reliability of our approach by
looking at a type of behavioral outcome for which the theory does not predict that high
influence parents should show more restrain than low influence ones. To this purpose, we
use information on church attendance. Consistent with intuition, the data show that high
influence parents are not less likely to attend church (in fact church attendance is increasing
with perceived influence, although not in a statistically significant way when enough controls
5
are added).
In order to understand the implications of our results for children’s outcome – and to
further validate the model in terms of cultural transmission – we match parental data with
the child’s propensity to experiment with smoking. In line with the theory and with existing
evidence, we find that children of smoking parents are more likely to try smoking than other
children. Of course, we cannot say how much of this correlation is due to example setting by
parents and how much is driven by unobserved factors. However, it is interesting to note that
children of high influence parents are less likely to experiment with smoking. Furthermore,
this effect is entirely driven by children who have been “vertically socialized” in the sense
that they report wanting to be like their parent.
Gaining a better understanding of the cultural transmission mechanism is not purely an
academic exercise. Policy proposals like imposing age restrictions on all films portraying
people engaged in the consumption of alcohol or tobacco ostensibly aim at manipulating
cultural transmission.5 Since these policies are unlikely to affect the physical pleasure of
(i.e. the deep preferences for) consuming alcohol or tobacco, their potential effects can
only be understood by explicitly analyzing information transmission. More generally, our
theory points to reducing the separation of adults and children as a potential policy lever
to encourage more farsighted behavior. The current lifestyle of most people in advanced
economies dictates that children spend most of their time at school and parents spend most
of their time on the workplace. This segregation may take extreme forms, as for instance in
the case of Chinese rural immigrant workers – and their “left behind” children who are left
in the care of grandparents and other relatives whilst the parents move to urban areas in
seek of employment opportunities.6 Most of the debate on the “left behind” generation has
focused so far on the effects on children’s outcomes and well being. Our analysis suggests
that the effects on parents of a reduction of parental influence should also be given careful
consideration.
The paper is organized as follows. After briefly reviewing the theoretical literature, we
present in Section 2 a two stage version of the model which illustrates the static effects
5See Longacre et al. (2009).
6The China Daily recently reported that the number of “left behind” children under 17 in rural areas
exceeds 60m.
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at work. Section 3 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium. Section 4 presents
an OLG version of the model and analyzes the long run distribution of behavioral traits.
Section 5 returns to the two stage version of the model to devise empirical predictions and
analyze the role of conformity. Section 6 presents some evidence suggesting a relationship
between parental influence and self-restraint and discusses the relevant empirical literature.
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
1.1 Related theories
There is a small but growing economic literature on parenting, which partially overlaps with
the literature on cultural transmission (see e.g. Weinberg, 2001, Linbeck and Nyberg, 2006,
Lizzeri and Siniscalchi, 2008, Corneo and Jeanne, 2009, Doepke and Zilibotti, 2011 and
2014). This literature has however focused on trade-offs that do not directly emerge from
the problem of setting an example to children and is thus complementary to the present
work. In particular, Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2008) consider the trade off between sheltering
the child from mistakes and encouraging learning from experience. In a similar vein, Doepke
and Zilibotti focus on the transmission of risk preferences (Doepke and Zilibotti 2011) and
parenting styles (Doepke and Zilibotti 2014).7 A common theme in these contributions
is the trade off between direct parental intervention (which we may call parental control)
and child’s autonomy. It is uncontroversial that in reality parents also try to prevent their
children from engaging in myopic or hazardous behavior through a mix of monitoring and
discipline. We abstract from these tools in order to focus on teaching by example, but these
could be easily incorporated into our theory. For instance, some parents induce the desired
behavior through teaching (including teaching by example), while respecting the child’s
autonomy (authoritative parenting). Other parents rely more on direct control (authoritarian
parenting). So long as influence (in the sense above) and control are substitutes, allowing for
direct parental control would magnify the effect we highlight. As more influence tends to be
associated with less control, the example set to children by high influence parents becomes
more important.
7Weinberg (2001) focuses on the choice between the use of an authoritarian parenting style and monetary
incentives. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2001) consider an incentive/insurance trade off. Corneo and Jeanne (2009)
look at the trade off between giving children an open mind and making them proud of their cultural traits.
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Some of the key ingredients of our analysis are also present in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006).
As in our case, parents strategically manipulate the information available to children in order
to partially redress a time inconsistency problem. In their model, this is however obtained
by suppressing information, while we focus on example setting. As a result, their model does
not predict any relationship between parental influence and observable parental behavior. A
similar argument applies to Cervellati and Vanin (2013), where parents induce children to
exert self-restraint by endowing them with moral values. Pichler (2010) considers a preference
transmission model where adults distort their behavior to affect their children’s preferences.
In our model, in contrast, adults’ behavior aims at manipulating the beliefs of children.
Finally, in a companion paper (Adriani and Sonderegger, 2016) we consider a framework
similar to the one adopted here. That work also looks at the effects of parent-child signaling,
but the signaling distortion is of a different nature. In that case, it is driven by the presence
of strategic uncertainty and the parents’ desire to shed their children from the costs of mis-
coordination. Here, we focus instead on the simpler – and perhaps more empirically relevant
– case of a distortion resulting from a conflict of interest between adults and their children.
2 A two stage model
We start off by analyzing a two stage version of the model to better highlight the static
effects at work. The environment is a two stage binary action global game (Carlsson and
van Damme, 1993) where adults adopt a behavioral trait/behavior in the first stage and
youngsters choose what trait to adopt in the second. Agents are heterogeneous in their
preferences over a given behavior. While each adult knows her own tastes, the distribution
of tastes in the population is unknown. Youngsters are uncertain about the desirability of
each behavioral trait and infer it from the observed behavior of an adult role model. An
OLG version of the model is presented in Section 4.
2.1 Environment
Behavioral traits and payoffsWe consider a setup with two generations, τ = Y,A, where
Y stands for “youngsters” and A stands for “adults”. There is a continuum of parent-child
pairs indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each agent, whether adult or youngster, can choose between two
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behavioral traits a ∈ {0, 1}. Action a = 1 (self-gratification) can be thought of as engaging
in potentially myopic or hazardous behavior (e.g. smoking, drinking, crossing outside cross
walks). Action a = 0 (abstinence) can be interpreted as abstaining from such behavior. We
set the payoff from abstinence equal to zero. The payoff from a = 1 of individual i ∈ [0, 1]
of generation τ = Y,A is separable as follows
uτi + v(xτ , xs) (1)
with s = Y,A, s 6= τ . The term uτi represents individual τi’s intrinsic taste for self-
gratification, net of its costs. We assume that the taste term can be decomposed into
uτi = u+θτi, where u ∈ R is a constant term common to all, and θτi is an individual specific
taste shock. Individual taste shocks for the adult cohort are assumed to be uniformly drawn
in the interval [θ − ǫ, θ + ǫ]. The distribution of tastes among the youngsters is determined
by the preference transmission mechanism (see below).
The function v : [0, 1]2 → R measures the pressure to conform coming from society. The
pair {xτ , xs} ∈ [0, 1]
2 represent the share of individuals choosing a = 1 in generations τ
and s, respectively. We assume that v is bounded, differentiable and, in order to induce a
coordination motive, non-decreasing in both its arguments. In words, the utility derived from
self-gratification is higher when most people do the same. Without any loss of generality, we
set
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0 v(xτ , xs)dxτdxs = 0.
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It is worth stressing that our model nests various settings, including: 1) A setup where the
social rewards from self-gratification only depend on the total mass of individuals choosing
it: v(xτ , xs) = v˜(xτ +xs), 2) A setup where individuals are only concerned about conforming
to members of their generation, i.e. v(xτ , xs) = v˜(xτ ).
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Paternalism Adults are altruistic towards their own children and do not care about the
welfare of other agents. Adults’ total utility is thus given by the sum of their own utility and
their perception of their child’s utility. Similar to Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) and Doepke
and Zilibotti (2014), a crucial assumption in our setup is that, when evaluating the welfare
of their children, parents are more farsighted than their children. In particular, we assume
8This can always be obtained by suitably reparametrizing the parameter u.
9It is also trivial to extend the model to accommodate asymmetric situations where, say, adults do not
care much about coordinating with youngsters while youngsters want to coordinate with the adults.
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that self-gratification entails long term costs c > 0, to be borne at an unspecified future date.
When choosing their behavioral trait, agents discount the long term consequences for their
own well being with a factor which, without loss of generality, we set equal to zero.10 In
contrast, when assessing their children’s welfare, adults use a larger discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, δ measures the degree of paternalism. We should note at this point that paternalism
induces a potential conflict of interests between parents and children. There may exist
situations where both a parent and her child prefer one action (e.g. smoking) but the parent
wants her child to choose the other (e.g. not smoking).11
Role models and parental influence In the first stage, all adults privately observe their
own taste term and simultaneously choose their behavioral trait. Then, each youngster is
randomly assigned a role model. With probability λ ∈ [0, 1], this is the youngster’s parent.
With probability 1− λ, it is another individual randomly drawn from the adult population.
In the second stage, youngsters observe the behavior of their role model and select their
behavioral trait.
The parameter λ, which is central to our analysis, thus measures the degree of parental
influence. Keeping everything else equal, we expect λ to be high when children have high ex-
posure to their parents, for instance because society is characterized by strong family ties.12
By contrast, environments characterized by pervasive external influences (generated for in-
stance by the media) that aggressively promote their lifestyle models correspond to a lower
λ. It is worth noting that the literature tends to restrict the notion of vertical transmission
to socialization occurring inside the nuclear family, while socialization by teachers, carers,
other relatives or family friends is bunched together with socialization by, say, celebrities
or fictional characters under the same oblique transmission label. In our setting, the key
operational distinction between vertical and oblique transmission is the presence or absence
10If all agents had a positive discount factor, β > 0, one could always obtain the present model by replacing
the term u with u∗ ≡ u− βc.
11 An alternative way to interpret our model is that parents do not fully internalize their children’s cost of
exerting self-control. This is important since empirical evidence suggests that time discounting may not be
the main driver of smoking behavior, while self control may be (see Khwaya et al. 2007).
12Alesina and Giuliano (2014) find that, although societies with strong family ties tend to have lower levels
of economic activity and more traditional attitudes toward women, they also tend to report higher levels of
health and well being. Our theory could potentially provide a non-obvious channel through which family ties
may affect health/well being.
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of concerns toward the youngster’s welfare. For the purposes of our model, it is thus per-
haps more convenient to think of socialization by all adults potentially concerned about a
youngster’s well being as more similar in nature to vertical transmission than to oblique
transmission.
Various models of cultural transmission postulate (or endogenously generate) heterogene-
ity in λ (see e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2001a). For the time being, we will assume that parental
influence is exogenous and the same for all adults. These assumptions will be relaxed in
Sections 4 and 5.1.
Preference transmissionWe follow existing literature and assume that each youngster Y i
inherits his taste term from his role model Aj, so that uY i = uAj . As already mentioned, with
probability λ, youngster i’s role model is his parent (so that Aj = Ai). With the residual
probability 1−λ, Aj is a random adult different from Ai. This mechanism, which blends ver-
tical and oblique transmission, is the backbone of most models of cultural transmission (e.g.
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981, Boyd and Richerson, 1985, Bisin and Verdier, 2001a). We
retain this assumption to ease the comparisons with existing literature, although other mech-
anisms would generate identical results in our setting. In particular, genetic transmission
(tastes inherited from the biological parent), conditional independence (youngsters’ tastes
independently drawn conditional on θ) and standard vertical/oblique transmission are all
equivalent in the two stage version of the model – although the dynamics in Section 4 would
need to be modified according to the chosen mechanism.13
Note that the nature of the transmission mechanism ensures that the distribution of θY i
is identical to the distribution of adults’ taste terms θAi, so that they are both uniform in
[θ − ǫ, θ + ǫ].
13 Formally, our results apply to all settings where E[uY i|θAi = z] = u+z. In words, a parent’s expectation
of her child’s taste is equal to her own taste. While genetic transmission obviously satisfies this requirement,
both the standard preference transmission framework and conditional independence are also consistent with
it when adults do not know the mean θ of the population. Ignoring boundary problems, each adult Ai
rationally expects the distribution of tastes of others to be centered around his own taste, so that E[θτj |θAi =
z] = E[θ|θAi = z] = z. Hence, E[uY i|θAi = z] = u + λz + (1 − λ)E[θAj |θAi = z] = u + z. An equivalent
interpretation of this condition, which we exploit literally in the dynamic version, is that adults evaluate
youngsters’ utility through the lenses of their own tastes as in Bisin and Verdier (2001a) and subsequent
literature.
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Information As mentioned above, adults and youngsters have different information about
the desirability of self-gratification. It seems plausible that youngsters may be unable to
accurately foresee the pleasure of casual sexual intercourse, or the addictiveness of smoking
and drinking habits. We model this by assuming that, while all adults privately observe
their own taste, uAi, youngsters do not observe uY i before choosing their action, but observe
instead the behavioral trait of their role model. We also assume that the distribution of
tastes is unknown. Agents do not observe the average taste shock θ, which is uniformly
drawn in the interval [−D,D].14
Since taste terms are correlated, the role model’s behavior conveys a signal about the
desirability of either behavioral trait. It is worth noting that all our results can be obtained
in an equivalent version of the model where there is uncertainty about the (possibly hetero-
geneous) long term consequences of self-gratification, rather than tastes. In the text, we will
maintain that the uncertainty is about tastes rather than consequences as tastes provide a
more intuitive source of heterogeneity.
3 Analysis
Let ∆p represent the difference between the probability that a youngster will engage in self-
gratification after his role model has chosen self-gratification and the same probability when
his role model chooses abstinence. If adult j is youngster i’s role model, then
∆p ≡ Pr(aY i = 1|aAj = 1)− Pr(aY i = 1|aAj = 0). (2)
The expected net payoff of a generic adult Ai from a = 1 can be expressed as
E[v(xA, xY )|θAi] + u+ θAi + λ∆p [E[v(xY , xA)|θAi] + u+ θAi − δc] , (3)
where we used the fact that, conditional on adult Ai being youngster Y i’s role model,
uY i = uAi.
15 The first three terms in (3) represent the adult’s direct expected utility, while
14The assumption that the mean shock in the population is unobservable allows us to exploit some results
in the literature on global games (see e.g. Morris and Shin, 2003).
15Note that the same result obtains whenever, conditional on vertical transmission, a parent expects his
child to share his own taste, i.e. E[uY i|uAi] = uAi. Since adults do not know the mean taste and use their
own taste to infer it, this would for instance be the case if youngsters’ and adults’ tastes were independently
drawn from identical distributions with unknown mean (conditional independence).
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the term in brackets captures the consequences of parental behavior on the child’s utility.
The latter is discounted by the factor λ∆p, which is the probability with which the parent’s
choice will affect her child’s choice.
It is instructive to compare the model with social learning with the case where children are
informed about their tastes and there is no information transmission. The crucial difference
between the two models lies in the different role played by ∆p. The behavior of a youngster
who is aware of his tastes is not affected by the behavior of his role model. As a result, when
choosing between the two actions, a parent maximizes her utility taking ∆p equal to zero.
By contrast, in the social learning case, the role model’s action conveys information about
the youngster’s tastes and thus affects the youngster’s behavior. An information externality
is thus present in this case. The value of ∆p depends on the youngster’s equilibrium strategy
and will be generally different from zero.
Bringing forward some of the results, it is possible to show that, for D sufficiently large,
youngsters always choose the same action as their role model in equilibrium independently
of whether they are informed or not. However, with informed youngsters, the correlation is
spurious. A youngster and his role model choose the same action because they happen to
have perfectly correlated tastes. By contrast, in the social learning model, there is a causal
relationship between the behavior of the role model and that of a youngster.
Before moving on to characterize the equilibrium of the game, it is worth discussing
briefly the issue of multiplicity. Our setup allows both for payoff complementarities and for
information externalities. Both complicate the task of pinning down a unique equilibrium.
A standard feature of binary action global games is that the indeterminacy disappears when
there is sufficient fundamental uncertainty about θ (see e.g. Morris and Shin, 2003). As
shown below, this also eliminates any indeterminacy due to signaling in our context. In
what follows, we will thus characterize the equilibrium for D sufficiently large. It is however
worth stressing that a large D is mostly needed to establish uniqueness. The equilibrium we
characterize exists so long as the fundamental uncertainty (D) is not too small relative to
the degree of heterogeneity in preferences (captured by ǫ). In economic terms, assuming a
large D relative to ǫ means that youngsters’ prior information is relatively poor relative to
the information available to adults – so that youngsters learn a lot from observing their role
model’s behavior. A potential drawback of this assumption is that the incentive to imitate
13
one’s adult role model trumps other considerations, like for instance conforming to peers.
By relaxing this assumption, our model could be used to analyze how, as the information
content of adults’ behavior becomes weaker, youngsters may choose to depart from the norms
of the previous generation.16 However, since our focus here is on the behavior of adults and
signaling concerns, we abstract from these issues.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
Youngsters are aware of the preference transmission mechanism and thus understand that
their tastes are correlated with those of the adults, but do not know ex-ante their own tastes.
As a result, the role model’s behavior conveys valuable information to the youngster.
Lemma 1. For D sufficiently large, the youngsters’ equilibrium strategy is to imitate their
role model, i.e. ∆p = 1.
Proof. See supplementary material.
This implies that, in any equilibrium, xA = xY ≡ x
∗. Consider an equilibrium where
adults choose a = 1 if and only if their private signal θAi is above a cutoff (the same for
all adults). In the supplementary appendix, we show that in this case E[v(xτ , xs)|θτi] is
non-decreasing in θτi and that it is zero when evaluated at θτi equal to the cutoff. Imposing
∆p = 1 in (3), one can then determine the cutoff θ∗SL as the realization of θτi that makes an
adult indifferent between the two actions,
θ∗SL =
λ
1 + λ
δc− u. (4)
Adults thus choose a = 1 whenever their taste shock θAi is above θ
∗
SL and youngsters fully
imitate their role model. The observed share of individuals choosing self-gratification, x∗,
depends on the value of θ∗SL, which is determined by the parameters of the model, and on
the average shock in the population, θ,
x∗ =


1 if θ > θ∗SL + ǫ
1
2 +
θ−θ∗SL
2ǫ if θ
∗
SL − ǫ ≤ θ ≤ θ
∗
SL + ǫ
0 if θ < θ∗SL − ǫ
(5)
16A prominent example are attitudes toward same sex marriage in the US, which show a clear generational
divide (see e.g. Sherkat et al., 2011.).
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Clearly, the higher θ∗SL, the lower the propensity to choose self-gratification. We thus
define the cutoff as the propensity to abstain.
The next result, whose proof heavily borrows from Morris and Shin (1998), establishes
that this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for D sufficiently large.
Proposition 1. For D sufficiently large, the social learning model has a unique equilibrium
where each adult Ai chooses self-gratification a = 1 if and only if her taste term θAi is above
a cutoff θ∗SL given by (4). Each youngster chooses self-gratification if and only if he observed
his role model choosing the same. In equilibrium the share of adults xA and the share of
youngsters xY choosing self-gratification are both equal to x
∗ in (5).
Proof. See supplementary material.
The comparative statics are summarized in the next corollary,
Corollary 1. The propensity to abstain, θ∗SL, and (for x
∗ ∈ (0, 1)) the share of agents
choosing abstinence, 1 − x∗, are both decreasing in the (prior) average desirability of self-
gratification u, and increasing in: the long term consequences of self-gratification, c, adults’
paternalism, δ, and parental influence λ.
As one might expect, self-gratification becomes more widespread as agents enjoy it more
(higher u), and less widespread as its long term consequences become more serious (higher
c) or as adults’ paternalism increases (higher δ). The role of λ will be the focus of the rest
of the paper.
It is again instructive to compare the social learning case to the case where youngsters
are informed and there are no signaling concern. In this case, since adults’ behavior does
not directly affect their children, ∆p is zero and the cutoff is θ∗I = −u. It follows that
Proposition 2. Whenever adults are paternalistic (δ > 0) and have positive influence over
their children (λ > 0), the propensity to abstain is higher under social learning than under
fully informed youngsters. The distortion due to signaling is θ∗SL − θ
∗
I =
λ
1+λδc > 0.
Proof. The result follows immediately by comparing θ∗SL and θ
∗
I .
Hence, whenever a degree of paternalism and of parental influence are both present,
a distortion due to signaling emerges in equilibrium. Adults have ceteris paribus a lower
propensity to choose self-gratification because they take into account the example they set
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to their children. Clearly enough, if whatever the parent craves is also deemed good for the
child (δ = 0), adults have no incentive to distort their behavior. A signaling distortion only
arises when there is a misalignment of incentives. In this case, a parent will try to strategically
manipulate her child’s behavior by altering her own behavior. Similarly, if parents have no
influence over their children (λ = 0), there is no point in teaching by example.
In Section 5, we use the two stage model to analyze the determinants of the signaling
distortion. We argue that the comparative statics on λ generate empirical predictions that
allow to test for the role of social learning. The next section looks instead at an OLG version
of the model to analyze the long run distribution of behavioral traits in the population.
4 The long run distribution of behavioral traits
In this section, we extend the baseline model to consider long run dynamics. In a series
of contributions, Bisin and Verdier (1998, 2001a, 2001b) analyze the mechanism generating
the long term persistence of cultural/behavioral heterogeneity observed in modern societies.
A common theme in these works is that convergence to a monomorphic population where
all share the same behavioral trait can be avoided in the presence of cultural sustitutability,
i.e. when the shrinking in popularity of a particular trait is matched by an increase in the
parental influence of adults displaying that trait relative to other adults. Here, we ask what
conditions are compatible with the long run persistence of heterogeneity when the effects of
social learning are taken into account.
We consider an OLG setting where individuals live for two periods. In each period,
agents play the two stage game by choosing behavioral trait a ∈ {0, 1}. Similar to the
baseline model, when member Ai of the adult generation chooses a ∈ {0, 1}, he obtains
a direct utility auAi, with uAi = u + θAi. Similarly, member Y i of the young generation
choosing behavioral trait a obtains auY i. Note that we are not imposing pressure to conform
at the outset. As will become clear, strategic interaction emerges endogenously in this version
of the model. We follow existing literature in assuming
1. Oblique/vertical transmission of preferences: Youngsters inherit the taste of their role
model.
2. Imperfect Empathy: Parents evaluate their children’s utility using their own preferences
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(augmented by paternalism).
These assumptions are not crucial but simplify the analysis and make the model compa-
rable with canonical models of cultural transmission. The second assumption ensures that
adult i’s assessment of her child’s (youngster i) utility is a(uAi−δc) independently of whether
vertical or oblique transmission occurs.
The information structure is similar to the baseline model. We assume that the support
of θ is sufficiently large, so that youngsters, who do not know their taste shock, always mimic
the behavioral trait of their role model. Upon becoming adults, agents learn their taste.17
Different from the baseline model in which there was no past to be observed, adults can
now also observe the frequency of each behavioral trait in the previous period (when they
were youngsters). This typically allows them to extrapolate the value of θ from the size of
heterogeneity in the recent past.18 It will thus make the exposition less convoluted to simply
assume that, upon reaching adulthood, agents can observe θ.19
The main difference with the previous sections is that we now endogenize the parental
influence parameter. In line with the cultural transmission literature, we allow the probability
that an adult adopting behavioral trait a becomes a role model for his child to depend on: 1)
the behavioral trait she adopts and 2) the current prevalence of that trait in the population.
We do not explicitly model how parental influence is determined but instead take a reduced
form approach. Formally, let λa : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be a differentiable function capturing parental
influence for trait a ∈ {0, 1}. We assume that the influence associated with each trait reflects
the state of society at the time when adults choose whether or not to adopt a different trait
17While it is clear that agents who engage in self-gratification when young would learn their taste for it, it
is less clear that agents who do not adopt the trait would necessarily learn it. We could assume that these
agents only learn their taste with some positive probability. In this setting, agent who do not learn their
tastes would simply keep mimicking the behavior of their role model in their adult life. This would bias
transmission in favor of abstinence without affecting the qualitative results.
18Whenever the distance between θ and the adults’ cutoff is less than ǫ, the share of adults choosing a = 1
is monotone in θ, so that observing the first involves learning the second.
19This has two effects. First, different from the baseline model where θ was not common knowledge, the
game is not a global game and thus the equilibrium will not be generally unique. Second, since adults
now know the average taste in the population, they could use this information to predict the taste of their
child. This implies that, in general, E[uY i|uAi] 6= uAi. Note, however, that, in order to avoid unnecessary
complications, we have imposed imperfect empathy at the outset in this version of the model.
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from that of their youth. As a result, the value of λa at time t + 1 depends on the share,
xY t, of time t + 1 adults who have chosen a = 1 in their youth. This captures the notion
that, while adults can change their behavioral trait in the short term, the strength of vertical
transmission adapts slowly to changes in society. For instance, people can quit smoking in
days if needed, but it takes years for a child to form his personality. The underlying idea
is that the lifestyle models proposed by society tend to reflect, rather than anticipate, the
behavioral changes in the population. We should also note here that parental influence in our
model should not necessarily be interpreted as the outcome of intentional socialization effort
by parents, as in Bisin and Verdier (2001b). Rather, in the tradition of the socio-biology
literature, the shape of λa simply reflects the presence of a conformist or anti-conformist
bias in society. This means that some types of behavior may become more or less salient
depending on the extent to which they conform to the dominant behavior in society.
4.1 Analysis
Since in equilibrium children conform to the behavioral trait of their role model, the total
payoff of adult i adopting trait a = 1 at time t+ 1 is
uAi + [λ1(xY t) + (1− λ1(xY t))xAt+1][uAi − δc], (6)
where the first term is the adult’s direct utility. The other terms are the adult’s perception
of the child’s utility from a = 1, given imperfect empathy and paternalism, weighted by the
probability that the child will choose a = 1 either through direct socialization, λ1(xY t), or
via oblique socialization, (1−λ1(xY t))xAt+1. The equivalent expression when adult i adopts
trait a = 0 is
(1− λ0(xY t))xAt+1[uAi − δc], (7)
so that, using uAi = u+ θAi, adult Ai’s net payoff is
20
u+ θAi + [λ1(xY t) + xAt+1(λ0(xY t)− λ1(xY t))][u+ θAi − δc]. (8)
This clearly reduces to the baseline model when λ0(x) = λ1(x) = λ, for all x. Since period t
adults know (or can extrapolate) the value of θ, they can perfectly anticipate the equilibrium
20Note that strategic complementarity/substitutability emerge endogenously in this version of the model
since the adult’s net payoff depends on the population frequency xAt+1.
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value, x∗At+1, of xAt+1. They thus best respond by adopting a threshold strategy with cutoff
θ∗t , given by
θ∗t+1 =
λ1(xY t) + x
∗
At+1(λ0(xY t)− λ1(xY t))
1 + λ1(xY t) + x∗At+1(λ0(xY t)− λ1(xY t))
δc− u. (9)
Given an equilibrium share x∗At+1 of adults choosing a = 1 in period t + 1, the share of
youngsters doing the same is
x∗Y t+1 = x
∗
At+1[λ1(x
∗
Y t) + x
∗
At+1(1− λ1(x
∗
Y t)) + (1− x
∗
At+1)(1− λ0(x
∗
Y t))]. (10)
In words, a youngster can end up adopting self-gratification either through vertical trans-
mission (xAλ1) or through oblique transmission (xA[xA(1− λ1) + (1− xA)(1− λ0)]). Since
youngsters inherit the tastes of their role models, the distribution of tastes in society,
f τt : [θ − ǫ, θ + ǫ]→ R
+, evolves accordingly to the following law of motion,
fAt+1(z) = f
Y
t (z) =


fAt (z)[λ1(x
∗
Y t) + x
∗
At+1(1− λ1(x
∗
Y t)) + (1− x
∗
At+1)(1− λ0(x
∗
Y t))] z > θ
∗
t
fAt (z)[λ0(x
∗
Y t) + x
∗
At+1(1− λ1(x
∗
Y t)) + (1− x
∗
At+1)(1− λ0(x
∗
Y t))] z < θ
∗
t .
(11)
A stationary state is a tuple (θs, xsA, x
s
Y , f
s
A, f
s
Y ), such that, for all t, xAt+1 = xAt ≡ x
s
A,
xY t+1 = xY t ≡ x
s
Y , f
A
t+1 = f
A
t ≡ f
s
A, f
Y
t+1 = f
Y
t ≡ f
s
Y for all z, and θ
∗
t+1 = θ
∗
t ≡ θ
s. Clearly,
from (11), f sA = f
s
Y ≡ f
s. Given that each youngster imitates his role model, this in turn
implies xsA = x
s
Y ≡ x
s. A stationary state must thus satisfy,
λ0(x
s) = λ1(x
s) if xs /∈ {0, 1} (12)
θs =
λ1(x
s) + xs(λ0(x
s)− λ1(x
s))
1 + λ1(xs) + xs(λ0(xs)− λ1(xs))
δc− u (13)
xs =


1 θs < θ + ǫ
∫ θ+ǫ
θs
f s(z)dz θs ∈ [θ − ǫ, θ + ǫ]
0 θs > θ + ǫ
(14)
The first condition comes from (10) once we impose the stationary requirement x∗At = x
∗
Y t.
The existence of an interior stationary state thus requires that the functions λ1 and λ0 cross at
least once, i.e. there exists xs ∈ (0, 1) such that λ0(x
s) = λ1(x
s) ≡ λs. Otherwise, stationary
states necessarily involve homogeneous (i.e. monomorphic) populations, i.e. xs ∈ {0, 1}.
The second condition comes from the cutoff expression (9). The third condition is a simple
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consistency condition requiring that, given cutoff θs, the long term distribution of tastes is
consistent with a share xs of the adult population above the cutoff.21
The dynamics of the model are determined by the co-evolution of the population fre-
quencies of behavioral traits and the distribution of tastes fAt . To gather intuition, suppose
that, given xY t, λ1 > λ0 at t + 1. This implies that individuals with taste terms above the
cutoff θ∗t+1 are more likely to transmit their tastes to their children than individuals below
the cutoff. In turn, this means that types above the cutoff will be overrepresented in the next
generation relative to the the types below the cutoff. Clearly, this effect feeds back into the
population frequencies, thus affecting λ0 and λ1 in ways that generate non-trivial dynamics.
Focusing on interior stationary states, conditions (12) and (13) together imply that the
long run cutoff satisfies the familiar expression
θs =
λs
1 + λs
δc− u (15)
where λs ≡ λ0(x
s) = λ1(x
s) is now the (endogenous) stationary level of parental influence.
To better illustrate how social learning affects the long run dynamics relative to standard
models of cultural transmission, we focus on two canonical examples.
x
λ1(x)
λ0(x)
xs 1
x
λ0(x)
λ1(x)
xs 1
Figure 1: Parental influence with cultural substitutability and complementarity.
In the left panel of figure 1, λ0 and λ1 are symmetric, with λ1 decreasing and λ0 increasing
in x. This is the textbook case of cultural substitutability: as the share of adults adopting
trait a = 1 increases, the influence of parents choosing a = 0 increases while that of parents
21Note, however, that there will generally be multiple pairs (fs, θs) yielding the same value of xs in (13).
Hence, while xs is pinned down by the condition λ0(x
s) = λ1(x
s), θs and fs are not.
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choosing a = 1 fades. In contrast, the right panel shows a situation where, as x increases,
those adopting a = 1 acquire more influence relative to those choosing a = 0. In this case,
there is clearly cultural complementarity (or a conformist bias). For instance, a conformist
bias in transmission arises when parental smoking becomes more salient when most adults
also smoke.
In the absence of signaling, the adults’ propensity to choose either action would be
exogenous with respect to x. In this case, the condition λ0(x) = λ1(x) would pin down a
stationary share xs of agents choosing a = 1. This stationary share would be stable in the
left panel but not in the right one. Intuitively, in the right panel, a small perturbation of x
to the right of xs would increase the influence of parents choosing a = 1 more than that of
parents choosing a = 0. In turn, keeping adults’ propensity to adopt trait a = 1 constant,
this would increase the share of adults choosing a = 1 in the next period, moving society
further away from the stationary state. This implies that, in the right panel, any stable
stationary state must involve a monomorphic population.
Things change if we take into account signaling concerns. It is easy to check that the
cutoff is increasing in x around xs provided that
x
dλ0(x)
dx
+ (1− x)
dλ1(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=xs
> 0. (16)
In the right panel, this clearly holds if λ0 is flatter than λ1 at x = x
s. If the cutoff is locally
increasing in x, the system need not converge to a monomorphic population. Intuitively, as
in standard models, a small shock moving x to the right of xs increases λ1 relative to λ0.
Crucially, however, behavioral trait a = 1 is now associated with higher parental influence.
This increases the signaling concerns of parents choosing a = 1, inducing some of them to
switch to a = 0. This effect in turn reduces x and might potentially move society to the left
of the stationary state, namely to a region where a = 0 carries larger influence. Explicitly
accounting for social learning might thus generate very rich dynamics.
A full blown analysis of the transitional dynamics is technically complex.22 We thus
provide a simple illustration of how signaling may affect the local dynamics in the proximity
of an interior stationary state.
22 A prominent problem is that the long run distribution fs will not be generally differentiable with respect
to θs.
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In general, the relationship between xY t and xAt+1 is given by
xAt+1 =
∫ θ+ǫ
θ∗t+1(xY t)
fAt+1(z)dz, (17)
whenever θ ∈ [θ∗t+1− ǫ, θ
∗
t+1+ ǫ]. Consider then the case where, close to the stationary state,
both λ0 and λ1 are small, so that most of the transmission is oblique. Small values for λ0
and λ1 imply that the change in f
A
t from one period to the next is negligible (see equation
11). In the proximity of the stationary state (where λ0 = λ1), f
A
t can thus be reasonably
approximated by the stationary distribution f s. By the same token, when both λ0 and λ1
are small and close to each other, xY t ≈ xAt. Equation (17) can thus be approximated by
xAt+1 =
∫ θ+ǫ
θ∗t+1(xAt)
f s(z)dz. (18)
Note that, while imposing small λs slows down the evolution of tastes, it does not affect
qualitatively the way in which signaling concerns respond to changes in xAt. This is because
the sign of the slope of the cutoff θ∗t+1 with respect to xAt depends on the slopes of λ0 and
λ1, rather than their levels.
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xAt+1
xAt
xs
xs
xAt+1
xAt
xs
xs
Figure 2: Dynamics around the stationary state.
Figure 2 provides two examples for equation (18). In both examples, the cutoff is in-
creasing in the proximity of the stationary state, so that xAt+1 and xAt are inversely related.
Periods of higher than average frequency of a = 1 are thus followed by periods of lower than
average frequency. Intuitively, an above average degree of self-gratification in one period
23Assuming small λs further simplifies the analysis by ensuring that the two stage game played in each
period has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
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raises the parental influence associated with self-gratification, so that some adults switch to
abstinence. In turn, this lowers the influence of self-gratification in the next period inducing
some to switch to self-gratification. In the left panel, small changes in xA yield sharp move-
ments of the cutoff. This happens if xs is not too large and λ1 is sufficiently steep relative to
λ0 in the proximity of x
s. As shown in the figure, in this case society will oscillate away from
the stationary state over time. In contrast, in the right panel, the cutoff is less sensitive, so
that a cycle converging to the interior stationary state is possible.
As noted above, a positive slope for the cutoff is not inconsistent with cultural comple-
mentarity. Hence, the cyclical behavior around the stationary state can emerge in spite of
a conformist bias in cultural transmission. Finally, the assumption that the λs are small
close to the stationary state helps to illustrate the role of signaling in a stark way by slowing
down the evolution of preferences. Similar results would obtain without this assumption so
long as the effect of signaling is sufficiently strong to offset the drift toward a monomorphic
equilibrium induced by the transmission of preferences.
To sum up, when signaling concerns and paternalism are taken into account, changes in
the share of adults choosing self-gratification affect parental influence. Through the signaling
mechanism illustrated in Section 3, this may change the propensity to choose self-gratification
in a way that allows heterogeneity to persist even in the presence of a conformist bias.
5 Empirical implications
In this section, we return to the baseline model to derive testable implications. The two stage
model – where λ is exogenous – is well suited to an empirical investigation on household
level data. The co-determination of (trait dependent) influence and population frequencies
of behavior analyzed in the previous section is to a large extent a dynamic phenomenon,
thus difficult to detect with cross-sectional data. Furthermore, we do not have empirical
measures of trait-specific parental influence, but only measures of generic influence. In other
words, the data tell us the extent to which the parent sees herself as a role model, but not
her specific influence in relation to smoking, drinking, etc. Any variation across adults in
perceived parental influence is thus unlikely to be driven by the population frequencies of any
specific behavioral trait. That said, in order to avoid a causal interpretation of our empirical
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results, we cast the model’s predictions in terms of simple correlations.
The central prediction of the theory is contained in the following Corollary to Proposition
2,
Corollary 2. Whenever δc > 0, the signaling distortion is increasing in the degree of parental
influence, λ. Under social learning, parental influence and the adults’ propensity to choose
self-gratification are thus inversely related. This effect is not present in the absence of sig-
naling concerns.
The model has also implications for children behavior. Clearly enough, since children
imitate their role model, we expect some correlation between the behavior of the parent and
that of the child. However, this prediction is not unique to social learning as positive correla-
tion between parent and child would emerge in virtually any model of cultural transmission.
More relevant for the mechanism considered here is the fact that parental influence has an
indirect effect on the observed behavior of children. Higher parental influence increases the
chances that adult Ai chooses abstinence and thus, through vertical transmission, reduces
the likelihood that his child will engage in self-gratification.
Corollary 3. Whenever δc > 0, the likelihood that a youngster will engage in self-gratification
is inversely related to parental influence.
The relationship between influence and the signaling distortion is deceptively simple. In
order to gain a better understanding of the effects at work, we need to introduce in the model
some heterogeneity in parental influence.
5.1 Parental differences in influence and the role of conformity
The empirical predictions of the baseline model have been cast in terms of comparative statics
for a society where adults share the same degree of parental influence. We now extend the
model to allow for heterogeneity in influence. There are two main reasons for analyzing this
case. First, most of the evidence available (and the one presented in the Section 6) comes from
differences in parental influence among members of the same society. For practical purposes,
we thus want to recast Corollaries 2 and 3 in terms of correlation between parental influence
and behavior at individual level. The second reason is that considering heterogeneity in
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parental influence helps to understand the role of conformity and how it complicates the
task of empirically measuring the distortion due to social learning.
We thus assume that there are two groups of adults in the population: High influence
adults (with influence parameter λH) and low influence adults (with parameter λL < λH).
The fraction of high influence adults is denoted with µ ∈ (0, 1). We assume that the existence
of the groups (and the parameters λH , λL, and µ) is common knowledge. Moreover, each
youngster knows whether his role model is in the high influence or in the low influence
group. A possible (but not necessary) interpretation for these assumptions sees low influence
adults as adults who are childless or geographically separated from their children. Another
interpretation is that these adults simply have less chances to interact with their children.
In experimental settings where the experimenter can control how salient an adult’s behavior
is to her child (Ben-Ner et al. 2015, Houser et al. 2016), type H adults can be interpreted
as a “treatment” group of adults who are fully visible to their children while type L adults
are the control group.
It will help the discussion to reduce the strength of the pressure to conform to a single
parameter. This is obtained by assuming that the v function has symmetric upper and lower
bounds: i.e. v(1, 1) = −v(0, 0) ≡ v > 0. In other words, the extra utility from choosing
self-gratification when everyone else does the same compared to a situation where everyone
chooses abstinence is 2v. The smaller the value of v, the flatter is the v function (and thus
the weaker the conformity motive). The next result characterizes the equilibrium in the
model with heterogeneous influence
Proposition 3. For D sufficiently large there is a unique threshold equilibrium and it is such
that: 1) Each youngster chooses self-gratification if and only if he observes his role model
choosing self-gratification; 2) High and low influence adults choose self-gratification if their
taste shock θAi is above thresholds θ
∗
H and θ
∗
L < θ
∗
H , respectively, where
θ∗H ≥
λH
1 + λH
δc− u− (1− µ)v (19)
θ∗L ≤
λL
1 + λL
δc− u+ µv (20)
with the above expressions holding with equality whenever
δc
λH − λL
(1 + λH)(1 + λL)
> v + 2ǫ (21)
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Proof. See supplementary material.
The RHS of (19) and (20) provide explicit solutions for the two groups’ propensities to
abstain when inequality (21) holds. When this condition does not hold, the expressions
provide a lower and upper bound for θ∗H and θ
∗
L, respectively. Qualitatively, the same
arguments apply independently of whether (21) holds or not, but the analysis is slightly
more convoluted in the latter case.
Unsurprisingly, adults with high influence tend to have a lower propensity to choose self-
gratification than low influence adults (i.e. θ∗H > θ
∗
L). In the absence of signaling concerns,
the two groups would obviously have identical propensity. If one can measure parental
influence at the individual level – or can manipulate it in an experimental setting – it is then
possible to test Corollaries 2 and 3 using variation in parental influence across individuals.
That said, Proposition 3 also illustrates the central difficulty in using individual differ-
ences in influence. Consider the simple case where (21) holds. It is immediate to verify
that, as the pressure to conform increases (i.e. a larger v), θ∗H becomes smaller whereas θ
∗
L
becomes larger. In other words, the need to coordinate makes each group’s propensity to
abstain closer to the one of the other group. This is not only driven by the fact that, in
the presence of complementarity, adults want to conform to the rest of society. They also
anticipate that their children will similarly want to conform. Whether it is the high influence
adults who mainly conform to the low influence ones or the opposite depends on the relative
size of the two groups (µ).
It is clear that pressure to conform, by inducing more coordination, generally makes the
task of empirically detecting the effect of social learning using variation in parental influence
more complicated. One can in principle identify two extreme classes of behavioral traits
1. Traits with a strong individualistic connotation where the pressure to conform is small
or non-existent (e.g. whether to take coffee with sugar or without)
2. Traits with a strong social connotation where the pressure to conform is strong (e.g.
participation in religious rituals).
In the first case, individual differences in parental influence will translate into relatively
large differences in the propensity for self restrain. In the second case, the propensity for
self restrain is mostly shaped by the average parental influence in the society and individual
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differences are less important. That said, most activities of interest are not easily classified
in either of the two categories above. For instance, eating, smoking, and drinking are in part
social activities. Similarly, work habits reflect individual preferences but also conformism.
It is clearly possible to design experiments that isolate the effect of parental influence from
the confounding effects of other social interactions, as for instance in Ben-Ner et al. (2015)
or Houser et al. (2016). However, whether this effect is strong enough to explain differences
among individual behavior in situations where the pressure to conform is non-negligible
remains an open question. In Section 6, we provide some evidence in this direction.
6 Evidence on parental influence and parental self-restraint
In this section we examine two empirical implications unique to the social learning model.
The first implication is stated in Corollary 2: parental influence is inversely related to
parental self-gratification. To do this we use micro-data with the novel property of contain-
ing information, for mothers and fathers, on (perceived) parental influence. We interrogate
the correlation between parental influence and two behaviors which fit well with the model,
smoking and excessive drinking. The second implication is stated in Corollary 3: parental
influence is inversely related to child self-gratification. Here we focus the analysis on the
child’s propensity to try smoking. As a secondary empirical exercise we use these data to
examine evidence of the intergenerational transmission of behavior from parents to children.
We emphasize that the purpose of this exercises is to test two qualitative predictions
of the social learning model. Estimation of structural parameters underlying the the social
learning model, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper.
6.1 Data
Data are drawn from wave A of the Iowa Youth and Families Project (Cogner et al., 2011).
The Iowa Youth and Families Project was designed to study how families in rural Iowa
coped with the economic stress that resulted from the 1980s farm crisis. The study collected
detailed household information from interviews, conducted in 1989, with 451 households
containing a child in seventh grade (12–14 year old). This child is referred to as the reference
child. Data include information on the reference child, the mother and the father.
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For our purpose, these data have the unique property of containing information, for
each of the mother and the father, on beliefs about the influence that parents have on their
children’s behavior. We create an index of perceived parental influence based on the five
questions presented in Table 1 (mother and father question labels in parenthesis). For each
question, mothers and fathers are separately asked to report the extent to which they agree
with each statement on a 1–5 scale (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree).
Table 1: Questions underlying the perceived parental influence index
a) The behavior of parents largely determines a child’s self-concept (am202024, af202024).
b) Parents don’t have much impact upon what their children grow up to be like (am202025, af202025).
c) Kids grow up to be a lot like their parents (am202026, af202026).
d) When kids are getting into trouble or having problems it is usually related to the behavior of their
parents (am202027, af202027).
e) Parents have a very strong influence upon the values of their kids (am202028, af202028).
Notes: Question labels for mother and father in parenthesis.
In question b), a higher value reflects a greater agreement with the influence of parents,
while in the remaining questions a higher value reflects greater disagreement with the in-
fluence of parents. We compute an index of parental influence by calculating the difference
b− a− c− d− e. An increase in the index value reflects a greater agreement that parental
influence is important. Observations are binned into one of three groups reflecting high,
medium and low beliefs, according to three quantiles of the index value.
These data also contain information that allows us to consider the extent to which a child
is “vertically socialised”. For each child we consider the answer to the following question
(asked separately for reference to the mother and father): “When I grow up, I’d like to be
like my father[mother]”. Children report the extent to which they agree with each statement
on a 1–5 scale (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree). We use this information to create
a single dummy variable equal to 1 if the child strongly agrees or agrees with respect to the
question framed to either the mother or the father, and 0 if the child answers otherwise. We
interpret this as a measure of the degree of vertical socialization; children who do not wish
to be like either parent are more likely influenced by external role models.
We focus the analysis on two behaviours relevant to the social learning model as presented
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in this paper. For each of the mother and father we look at whether the parent is a smoker
or non-smoker and how many times in the past month the parent consumed four or more
alcoholic drinks in a single day. We also look at a different behavior, likely not viewed as
setting a bad example, how frequently do parents attend religious ceremonies24. In addition,
the analysis makes use of a number of control variables including household income, age
and education for mother and father, the reference child’s sex, age, and the number of older
and younger siblings. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2, with further summary
statistics and the details of relevant variables provided in the supplementary appendix to
this paper.
Mean values of each variable are reported for low, medium or high perceived influence in
columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2. Variables which refer to child or household characteristics are
reported by father’s perceived influence. Column 4 presents p-values corresponding to an
F-test of the null hypothesis that the mean values are the same across all parental influence
quantiles. In the case of education categories the p-value corresponds to a chi-squared test
of equality in the distribution across each education category.
A number of details are worth noting. First, smoking and drinking are both lower
for parents with higher perceived influence (although only smoking is significantly different
across the quantiles) and church attendance is increasing with the perceived influence index.
Education, for both mother and father, significantly differs across the quantiles; parents with
a higher perceived influence also tend to be more educated. Household earnings are also
increasing with perceived influence, although the difference is not statistically significant.
Finally, mean values for almost all other characteristics are statistically indistinguishable
across the three quantiles (the exception being the number of siblings older than the reference
child). Interestingly, this also applies to our measure of vertical socialization: whether or
not a child reports wishing to be like at least one of their parents.
6.2 Parental influence and parental behavior
The simple correlation between parental smoking/drinking and perceived parental influence
reported in Table 2 is consistent with the hypothesis of the social learning model: parents
who believe they have a greater influence on their children are less likely to engage in these
24Based on a derived frequency. See supplementary appendix for details.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Perceived parental influence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Father Low Medium High p-value
Smoker 0.455 0.412 0.256 0.002
Drinks (days per month) 1.935 1.447 1.224 0.249
Church (per year) 34.735 36.929 45.600 0.020
Age 40.340 39.300 39.536 0.140
Education
< High school 0.077 0.024 0.024
High school 0.545 0.376 0.376
PS, < 4 years 0.269 0.353 0.248
4-year degree 0.083 0.165 0.256
> 4-year degree 0.026 0.082 0.096 0.000
Mother
Smoker 0.319 0.164 0.212 0.005
Drinks (days per month) 0.748 0.503 0.219 0.180
Church (per year) 39.378 47.624 47.669 0.047
Age 37.519 37.879 37.662 0.747
Education
< High school 0.044 0.012 0.013
High school 0.541 0.436 0.331
PS, < 4 years 0.311 0.375 0.411
4-year degree 0.096 0.152 0.219
> 4-year degree 0.007 0.018 0.026 0.009
Child†
Wish to be like parent? 0.558 0.536 0.584 0.708
Ever tried smoking? 0.205 0.271 0.136 0.019
At least one parent smokes 0.564 0.512 0.288 0.000
Age 12.577 12.624 12.648 0.532
Sex (male=1) 0.474 0.488 0.464 0.917
Only child 0.308 0.376 0.352 0.423
Number of younger siblings 0.603 0.582 0.704 0.382
Number of older siblings 0.391 0.335 0.200 0.027
Household earnings 24,263 27,223 28,047 0.127
Observations 156 170 125
Notes. p-value reflects a test of the null hypothesis that mean values are equal for low, medium and high
perceived parental influence. †Perceived parental influence for child’s variables reflects that of the father.
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behaviors. However, this relationship is also open to alternative explanations. For example,
there is a well documented negative relationship between education and smoking (see for
example, de Walque, 2007). In Table 2 we see that parents with higher levels of eduction
perceive a greater influence of parental behavior on children’s behavior. This leads to con-
cern that the correlation between smoking/drinking and parental influence may be spurious,
attributable to differences in underlying preferences (reflected in education choices). For
example, relative to parents with high future discount rates, it is likely that parents who
discount the future less heavily receive more education, smoke and drink less, and place
more weight on their children’s long run welfare. These parents therefore have an incentive
to believe they have more influence on their children. If this explanation accurate, condi-
tioning on education will significantly decrease the smoking/drinking and perceived parental
influence correlation observed in Table 2.
To account for this we consider the following regression:
ypi = α0 + α
p
MPPIM
p
i + α
p
LPPIL
p
i +AGE
p′
i Γ1 + EDUC
p′
i Γ2 +X
′
iΓ3 + ζ
p
i (22)
where ypi is the outcome of interest (smoking, drinking, church) for parent p ∈ {mother,
father} in household i. PPIMpi and PPIL
p
i are dummy variables to indicate the parent
belonging to either the medium or low perceived parental influence quantile. AGEpi is a
vector which includes a quadratic term for parent p’s age, and EDUCpi is a vector of ed-
ucation dummy variables corresponding to parent p to allow for a discontinuous impact of
education. Xi is a vector of household and child variables, including sex and age of the ref-
erence child, an only-child indicator, separate variables for the number of older and younger
siblings, and annual household earnings25. ζpi reflects the influence of unobserved variables.
The coefficients of interest, αpM and α
p
L, reflect the incremental effect of parent p having a
medium or low perceived influence relative to parent p having a high perceived influence.
This interpretation of the estimated values αˆpM and αˆ
p
L is subject to the assumption that any
unobserved variables that influence the outcome are uncorrelated with perceived parental
influence.
We report different estimates of αpM and α
p
L in Table 3. In panel A we report a regres-
sion of each outcome on the medium and low quantile dummies, excluding control variables.
25Six observations are omitted from the analysis due to missing information on household earnings.
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To this we compare estimates for equation (22) using OLS (panel B) and propensity score
matching26 (panel C). The comparison of panel A to panels B and C provides information
about the importance of unobserved characteristics, such as discount factors. If these un-
observables are important then we expect to see large changes in the estimated coefficients
across the different estimates. Panels B and C provide two different methods for estimation
based on matching on observables27. If estimates are robust, we expect these methods to be
in agreement with one another.
The estimates reported in Table 3 are generally consistent with the predictions of the
social learning model. Among fathers with a high perceived parental influence, 25.5% smoke.
Smoking is 15.6 and 19.9 percentage points higher among fathers with indexes in the medium
and low quantiles. Similarly, heavy drinking is more common among fathers with low and
medium perceived influence than those with high perceived influence, although these esti-
mates are noisy. As expected, church attendance does not behave in the same way. We see
significantly greater church attendance among parents with high perceived influence. This is
consistent with church attendance reflecting a behavior into which parents hope to positively
influence their children.28
The non-trivial increase in the R2, between panels A and B, suggests that the additional
control variables play a significant role in explaining the outcomes. However, the patterns
are similar to what is observed in the unconditional correlations. Controlling for parental
education, age and a number of other household characteristics we find that fathers who
have a low perceived influence index are between 16.7 and 18.1 percentage points more likely
to smoke than are fathers who have a high perceived influence index, very close to what
was observed in panel A. For mothers, a low perceived influence index is associated with
between a 6.8 and 14.7 percentage point increase in smoking, relative to a high perceived
influence index, with the propensity score estimates statistically significant. Similar estimates
are found for drinking, which is statistically significant and positive for both mothers and
26See the supplementary material for the full set of reported coefficients and balancing tests for the propen-
sity score matching.
27Angrist (1998) shows that OLS regression is equivalent to a matching method which weights according to
the variation in treatment across different control values. Propensity score matches based on the probability
that an observation receives treatment. In the current context, ‘treatment’ refers to either PPIMpi = 1 or
PPIL
p
i = 1.
28See also Patacchini and Zenou (2016) for an analysis of the transmission of religiosity.
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Table 3: Parent behavior and parent’s perceived influence in child
Father Mother
Smoking Drinking Chruch Smoking Drinking Chruch
A. Unconditional
Medium 0.156*** 0.223 -8.671** -0.048 0.284 -0.0446
(0.054) (0.384) (4.059) (0.044) (0.219) (3.693)
Low 0.199*** 0.711 -10.86*** 0.107** 0.530* -8.291**
(0.056) (0.451) (4.118) (0.052) (0.279) (3.797)
N 451 451 451 451 451 451
R2 0.023 0.002 0.013 0.019 0.003 0.009
B. Conditional
Medium 0.141*** 0.300 -6.098 -0.061 0.339 1.453
(0.055) (0.393) (3.981) (0.044) (0.255) (3.566)
Low 0.167*** 0.606 -6.460 0.068 0.533* -4.655
(0.060) (0.485) (4.114) (0.054) (0.286) (3.846)
N 451 451 451 451 451 451
R2 0.056 0.065 0.074 0.071 0.024 0.092
C. Propensity score
Medium 0.149* 0.745 -4.025 -0.043 0.340 2.190
(0.086) (0.496) (6.739) (0.064) (0.251) (5.209)
Low 0.181** 1.138* -0.362 0.147** 0.620** -7.829
(0.085) (0.621) (6.439) (0.072) (0.301) (6.137)
N (medium) 280 280 280 308 308 308
N (low) 261 261 261 275 275 275
Mean values for high 0.256 1.224 45.60 0.212 0.219 47.67
perceived influence
Notes. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, ***, denote statistical significance at 10%,
5% and 1%. Panel A and Panel B report the results of unconditioned and conditioned linear regressions of
behavior on perceived influence (high influence is the excluded category). Conditioned regressions control
for parent age (quadratic), parent eduction, age and sex of reference child, number of older and younger
siblings, only child status. See data appendix for regression details as well as all estimated coefficients.
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fathers in the propensity score estimates. For church attendance, all differences between high
and low parental influence are negative, although not statistically significant.
The analysis we present here suggests that parents who perceive parental behavior to
influence the behavior (or future behavior) of the child are less likely to engage in smoking
and drinking and more likely to attend church regularly. We interpret this as being consistent
with parents behaving strategically, in a manner that conforms with the social learning
model. This is also consistent with the evidence from experimental studies. Houser et
al. (2016) create a coin-toss experiment in which parents have the opportunity to cheat.
Varying the presence of children during the experiment, they find that the presence of a
daughter significantly reduces the tendency of parents to cheat. While the experimental
setting allows them to cleanly estimate the effect of child presence on parental behavior,
they cannot distiguish between two motives: does the parent not wish to appear dishonest
to the child or, does the parent wish to transmit pro-social behaviour to the child? Ben-Ner
et al. (2015) report that parents increase their contributions in the dictator game when they
are aware that these will be shown to their children.
6.3 Parental influence on child behavior
The social learning model states that children will be influenced by the behavior of their
parents. To explore this in our data we focus on parent and child smoking.29 Intergener-
ational transmission suggests that we should expect to see a positive relationship between
child smoking (or experimentation with smoking) and parental smoking. However, a positive
correlation from an OLS regression is consistent with alternative mechanisms of intergen-
erational transmission and is not unique to the social learning model. Therefore, we also
provide a test of Corollary 3: youngster smoking is inversely related to parental influence.
We start by estimating the relationship between child and parent smoking based on the
following equation:
SMOKECi = β0 + β1SMOKE
P
i +H
′
iΠ+ µi, (23)
where SMOKECi is a variable equal to 1 if the reference child in household i has ever smoked
tobacco, and 0 otherwise. SMOKEPi is a variable equal to 1 if either the mother or father
29The focus on smoking is due to the fact that this is the variable for which we both have reliable information
on parent and child choices, and which yields relatively precise estimates in Table 3.
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Table 4: Parental influence on child smoking
Outcome: Child smokes Parent smoking Perceived parent influence
OLS IV External Parental
role model role model
A1 A2 B1 C1 C2 C3
Parent smokes 0.112*** 0.097** 0.334**
(0.038) (0.042) (0.149)
Perceived parent influence First stage
Low (father) 0.235*** 0.048 -0.068 0.132**
(0.060) (0.048) (0.084) (0.056)
Medium (father) 0.223*** 0.111** -0.022 0.189***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.080) (0.056)
Low (mother) 0.124** 0.068 0.102 0.068
(0.055) (0.052) (0.086) (0.063)
Medium (mother) -0.089* 0.004 0.027 -0.008
(0.054) (0.045) (0.075) (0.058)
Controls included No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 451 445 445 445 196 249
R2 0.019 0.104 0.025 0.108 0.165 0.148
F-stat (first stage) 9.370
Sargan’s χ2 (p-value) 0.376
Notes. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, ***, denote statistical significance at 10%,
5% and 1%. Coefficients for separate regressions reported in each column. Columns A1 and A2 reflect OLS
regression of child smoking on parent smoking without and with control variables. Column B1 reflects the
IV regression of child smoking on parent smoking. Perceived influence index variables are the excluded
instruments. First stage results reflect regression of parent influence on parent smoking. First stage F-stat
corresponds to a test of the joint significance of all excluded instruments in the first stage regression.
Sargan’s χ2 reflects a test of the null hypothesis that excluded instruments are exogenous. Columns C1, C2
and C3 regress child smoking on parental influence for all children and limiting to children with external role
models and internal role models, respectively.
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in household i smoke, and 0 otherwise. Hi is a vector of control variables reflecting the
characteristics of parent, household, and child. Hi includes age and education level of both
parents, sex and age of the reference child, an only-child indicator, separate variables for
the number of older and younger siblings, and annual household earnings. µi reflects the
influence of unobserved variables on SMOKECi . The coefficient of interest, β1, reflects the
incremental probability that a child smokes when one (or both) of his or her parents smoke,
conditional on Hi.
The regression results are reported in columns A1 (unconditional) and A2 (conditional
on Hi) of Table 4. Coefficient estimates suggest that a child with a parent who smokes is
about 10 percentage points more likely to smoke. While these results are consistent with
the existence of intergenerational transmission, our theory implies that they are likely to
exhibit a downward bias as a result of the endogenous relationship between parental and
child smoking. If parents indeed behaved strategically, they would tend to avoid smoking
precisely when they are concerned that their child might be experimenting with smoking.
To account for this we estimate the relationship in equation (23) using parents’ perceived
influence as an instrument for parental smoking. This strategy is summarized in the following
equations:
SMOKEPi = η0 +
∑
p
(
ηpMPPIM
p
i + η
p
LPPIL
p
i
)
+H ′iΛ + ωi (24)
SMOKECi = β0 + β1
̂SMOKEPi +H
′
iΠ+ µi. (25)
All variables in the second equation are the same as those in equation (23), with the exception
of ̂SMOKEPi .
̂SMOKEPi is the predicted value from the first equation, in which parental
smoking is regressed on dummies for medium and low perceived parental influence for both
mother and father, and all control variables contained in Hi.
We approach the instrumental variable procedure with a note of caution. For perceived
parental influence to be a valid instrument it must only impact child’s smoking through
parental smoking. This assumption is clearly violated if the parent’s perceived influence
changes another behavior and that behavior influences both child and parent smoking. For
example, if parents with a high perceived index are more likely to attend church, and church
attendance influences smoking, this would violate our assumption. With this in mind we
cautiously interpret the instrumental variable estimates.
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The coefficient reported in B1 suggests a strong parental effect. Parental smoking leads
to a 33.4 percentage point increase in child smoking. Further, this results suggests that the
magnitude of the intergenerational effect is underestimated by OLS, potentially due to par-
ents of children with higher predisposition to smoke being more likely to pre-emptively forgo
smoking. The coefficients for the parent’s perceived index reflect the first stage regression
of parental smoking, and are consistent with the results reported in Table 3. We test the
over-identifying restrictions of the model using Sargan’s χ2, from which we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are exogenous.30
Finally, we present a direct test of Corollary 3 from the social learning model: child
smoking is inversely related to parental influence. To do this we estimate equation (23),
replacing SMOKEPi with a vector of perceived parental influence indicators for both par-
ents, {PPIMfatheri , PPIL
father
i , PPIM
mother
i , PPIL
mother
i }. The corresponding coeffi-
cients, representing the incremental probability of a child smoking relative to having parents
with a high influence index value, are reported in column C1. There is a weak, positive corre-
lation between being in a lower quantile and child smoking (although this is only significant
for fathers medium index values). In columns C2 and C3 we repeat this regression for the
sub-groups of children who do not perceive their parents as role models and for those who
do31, respectively. As expected, we do not find a significant correlation between child smok-
ing and parental index values when the child does not view parents as role models. However,
when parents are role models, we find that the father’s perceived influence is significantly
correlated with child smoking. We interpret this result as consistent with Corollary 3. A
child is 12.3 percentage points more likely to smoke if his or her parent is in the lowest index
group (relative to the highest).
7 Concluding remarks
What is the object of cultural transmission? Does it consist in the transmission of prefer-
ences? Or does it involve the transmission of beliefs? Or perhaps a combination of both?
The answers to these questions have far reaching consequences not just for our understand-
30However, it should be noted that the validity of this test is dependent on at least one of the excluded
instruments being exogenous.
31Based on the “When I grow up, I’d like to be like my father[mother]” question discussed in section 6.1
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ing of the world, but also for policy and welfare analysis. For instance, while economists
typically acknowledge the fact that de gustibus non est disputandum, beliefs can be shown
to be false or unjustified. In spite of this, the literature on cultural transmission has almost
entirely focused on the transmission of preferences, largely neglecting the role of beliefs. This
paper contributes to the literature by giving beliefs the center stage. Our model shows that
the transmission of beliefs from adults to children has precise implications for the strategic
behavior of parents. This approach thus provides an indirect way to assess the relevance of
beliefs in the transmission of culture. Moreover, some of these effects are quite subtle and
may inform the policy debate.
Empirically, we find some evidence for the prediction that parents strategically adopt
behaviors aimed at setting examples to their children. The extent to which a parent sees
herself as a role model is inversely related to her propensity to consume alcohol or tobacco
and to the likelihood that her child will experiment with smoking.
Finally, and clearly enough, we should mention that our narrow focus leaves out im-
portant aspects of socialization, like for instance school, neighborhood, or marriage choices.
Future work should therefore be aimed at incorporating these elements into our theory.
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